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The ingenious mind ofman can conjure up subtle methods ofsearch
through modern electronics as reprehensible as kicking down a
door. United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1973).
I. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist assault of 2001 on the United States altered the delicate
balance between individual security and national security. Within days of
the attack, a nation that once placed a uniquely high value on personal
privacy seemed ready to swap it for public safety, and what was once
denounced as Orwellian was suddenly embraced as reasonable. But as the
traumatic memories of the tragedy begin to heal, many Americans are
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again questioning the legal propriety of the modem surveillance tools that
government has recently employed in its longtime war on crime and late
war on terror. Preeminent among these tools are electronic visual
surveillance and the face-recognition technology used in some public
surveillance cameras. As of yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed
neither issue.
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it seeks to examine the
issue of electronic visual surveillance from a legal perspective. Second,
and attendant to this, it seeks to establish clear standards to regulate this
new technology and limit its intrusiveness. Toward this end, I will begin
by briefly discussing the uses, potential benefits, and civil concerns of
continuous video surveillance of public places by government-installed
cameras, and proceed to investigate the various constitutional issues
surrounding this technology. As I go along, I will propose guidelines to
keep the practice constitutional and minimally intrusive. Finally, and by
way of conclusion, I will summarize my findings and suggestions. Since
the High Court has not assessed the constitutionality of public video
surveillance, I will draw on illustrative lower federal court cases as well as
the analysis of legal scholars to set the appropriate guidelines.
II. USES AND POTENTIAL ABUSES OF ELECTRONIC
VISUAL SURVEILLANCE

Public video surveillance has recently become one of the most
conspicuous manifestations of, and effective instruments in, the exercise
of the state's police powers. The development of surveillance technology,
and its late convergence with state of the art computers, databases, and
telecommunication systems, has dramatically enhanced government's
ability to perform its law enforcement functions. But, it has equally
increased the tension between the need of government to combat the daily
threats to public safety and the right of law-abiding citizens to be secure
from the potential privacy abuses of modem policing technology.
Law enforcement authorities around the world attest that closed circuit
television (CCTV) cameras help investigate and solve crimes by recording
illegal and violent acts as they occur.' The evidence caught live on
1. In one year, video surveillance cameras captured 75% of all the crimes investigated by
Canadian law enforcement or private security. A similar video surveillance system used in the
national rapid transit system in Paris has detected 83% of all criminal incidents. See Marcus Nieto,
Public Video Surveillance: Is It an Effective Crime Prevention Tool?, June 1997, available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/05 (last visited Oct. 15,2004). The English town of Scunthorpe,
a popular tourist destination, reported a 50% drop in crime in the first year cameras were
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videotape is among the most reliable and is known to result in the highest
conviction rate because, unlike people, the camera and the tape cannot lie.2
Videotaping makes the credibility of the witness or claims by the suspect
or the officer a less critical issue by presenting the court with indisputable
and objective evidence, free from personal predilection and subjective
assessment.3 With their long-range and wide-area monitoring capabilities,
surveillance cameras have a significant deterring effect, and have helped
police foil many of the crimes that take place in public such as vandalism,
mugging, car theft, drug distribution, and drive-by shooting.4 In some
cases, CCTV cameras have enabled police to intervene during the
commission of an unlawful act and catch the culprit red-handed.' CCTV

introduced. See John Spittlehouse, Reaping Benefits of eBig Brother, SCUNTHORPE EVENING
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 16, 2002, at 4. The installation of 50 security cameras in the Kabukicho

entertainment district of Tokyo, Japan, reduced crime by about 13% in one year. Security cameras
will be installed in 6 more entertainment quarters. See Big Brother Cramping Criminals' Style,
DAILY YOMIURI, July 23, 2003, at 3. During the first 7 months of installing public surveillance
cameras in high-crime Chicago neighborhoods, serious crime went down by 17% and all other
crimes went down by 46%. See Fran Spielman, Police Cams to Add Gunshot Detectors, CHI. SUNTIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at I1; see also infra note 4.
2. Cook County Sheriff's Office in Illinois achieved a DUI Conviction rate of 99% because
of incriminating tapes showing motorists unable to walk a straight line. See Maureen O'Donnell,
Grants to Help Catch Speeders; Cameras Pay Offfor Sherifs Policy, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, May 22,
2000, at 22.
3. A video recording could be used at trial, not only to convict the actual perpetrator of an
offence, but also to acquit the wrongly accused. For instance, in Orange County, California, a police
videotape directly contradicted an officer's testimony, conclusively showing that the defendant was
not read his Miranda rights prior to questioning him in the back of a patrol vehicle. See Scott
Moxley, Testilying: Video EmbarrassesDA, Newport Cops, OC WKLY., May 28, 1999, at 12. In
Chicago, a public official was acquitted of DUI charges after a videotape of his arrest by a police
officer clearly showed that he was not impaired, contrary to the officer's statement that he had
stumbled while attempting to walk a straight line. See Stacy St. Clair, Do Police Videotapes Lie?
No, But It Might Not Tell the Whole Story at a DUI Stop, Some Say, CI. DAILY HERALD, May 22,
2001, at 1.
4. Within 3 years of the installation of a $3 million system in 1998 in one London borough,
assaults on individuals had declined 210/6, vandalism 26%, and burglaries 39%.See Barbara Dority,
Big Brother Is Watching! A Brave New World - Or A Technological Nightmare?, 61 THE
HUMANIST 10 (2001). The British Home Office reports a 41% overall decrease in vehicle crime in
car parks where CCTV has been installed. See Tackling Crime in a World of Vast Change,EVENING
CHRON., Sept. 23, 2002, at 22; Big Brother is Watching, S. WALES EVENING POST, Feb. 19, 2003,
at 15. Police in Darebin, Australia reported that residential, commercial, and aggravated burglaries
had dropped by 16%, 19%, and 40/, respectively, in the first half of the 12-month security camera
pilot project that debuted in January 2003. See Sally Norris, New Assault on Crime, MOONEE
VALLEY LEADER Mar. 29, 2004, at 1.
5. Richard Pendlebury, Hi-Tech Eyes Help to Crack Crime, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 17, 1993,
at 12.
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cameras also have many functional uses in the areas of traffic management
and highway safety, and have proven particularly useful during morning
and evening peak hours. By observing the flow of traffic and freeway
conditions from cameras located at strategic points, police can identify
unsafe drivers, detect disabled and abandoned vehicles, plan rescue
operations and direct resources to respond more effectively, eyewitness and
capture incidents of hit-and-run and accidents as they happen, and
reconstruct crash scenes more objectively and accurately.6
Video surveillance has been used for quite some time in the United
Kingdom to monitor city centers, public transportation facilities, and highcrime neighborhoods. With over 4 million surveillance cameras observing
virtually all aspects of life, from commuting to shopping to dining, Britain
has more public surveillance cameras per capita than any other country in
the world, where the ratio is 1 camera for every 14 people, and an average
person living in a major city may be filmed 300 times a day.7 London
Underground currently has 6000 CCTV cameras that cover 95% of
stations, a number that could possibly increase by 50% in the next few
years with the installation of cameras aboard the trains.8 The city of
London alone has more than 150,000 CCTV cameras.9 Scotland's biggest
city, Glasgow, launched the largest surveillance system in any European
city in November 1994."0 The security cameras monitor the city's main
business, commercial, and tourist areas." The 200 cameras, which are to

6. The Department of Main Roads in Queensland, Australia, is now using an integrated
Intelligent Transport System (ITS) to manage freeways and signalized intersections. The system
presently operates 1200 signalized intersections and provides a wide range of services from traffic
signal management to incident detection and response, and from travel time advisory to parking
guidance. See Intelligent Transport System Queensland Web Site, at http://www.itsq.com.au/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004). In the United States, transportation management centers in several states also
use traffic surveillance cameras to monitor roadways and report travel information to drivers via
Internet web sites. See Keri A. Funderburg, FHWA Honors Top Traveler InformationSites, 67 PUB.
ROADS (2004), availableat http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/04jan/iwatch.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2004).
7. AndreaThompson, Big Brother UK, DAILY MAL, Jan. 23,2004, at 24; Mark Rice-Oxley,
Big Brother in Britain: Does More Surveillance Work?, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONIToR, Feb. 6, 2004,
at 7; Rowland Nethaway, Security Cameras Seem to Be in All Public Places, PALM BCH. DAILY
NEws, Apr. 19, 2004, available at http://www.palmbeachdailynews.com/news/content/shared/
news/politics/stories/04/I 7nethway.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
8. Yvonne Singh, Who Is Watchingover Us?, EVENING STANDARD, May 17,2004, at J2, J3.
9. Id.
10. Bill Caven, TV Surveillance Launched but £540,000 Needed to Make it Last, THE
HERALD, Nov. 2, 1994, at 3.
11. Id.
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double over the next several years, feed into a central control room and are
monitored 18-24 hours a day.12 Glasgow credits the system with a 68%
crime reduction rate after three years from initial installation.'3 Crime has
also dropped by a dramatic 75% in the neighboring
town of Airdrie that
4
employs similar surveillance techniques.'
Despite their ubiquity, crime prevention surveillance systems are
widely supported by the British public.'" In fact, one of England's earliest
surveillance systems was installed at the insistence of the public and was
even partially paid for by local businesses. 6 That was the system of the
historic city of Northampton, which was introduced in the early 1990s in
the wake of the IRA intense bombing campaigns. The security cameras in
Northampton, as in other British towns, have a pan-tilt-zoom capacity,
which allows police to detect and record virtually any activity taking place
in the central pedestrian and vehicle routes around the clock. 7 Both shortand long-term results were quite impressive. The cameras led to 17 arrests
the same month they became fully operational." Two and a half years after
the system's installation, police have solved 85% of all crimes in the
monitored areas.' 9 By the mid-1990s, Northampton's crime record had
been cut by 57%.20
With over four times the population of Britain, the United States lags
behind its European counterpart in public video surveillance, but it is
gradually catching up. Surveillance systems were first introduced in a
limited number of U.S. cities between 1993 and 1996. The number of
anticrime surveillance projects increased as the initial experiments yielded
positive results. In Tacoma, Washington, for instance, incidents involving
assaults, trespassing, prostitution, and vandalism declined by 35% from
12. Vivienne Nicholl, Plan to Double Number of "Spy" Cameras;Glasgow Bidsfor Cash
Backingfrom Scottish Executive for New CCTV Scheme, EVENING TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2001, at 9.
13. Brian J. Taylor, The Screening ofAmerica: Crime, Cops, and Cameras, REASON, May
1997, at 45.
14. Id.
15. The popular city of Bath in southwest England is a case in point, where 88% of residents
questioned about a new surveillance system favored its extension, and 93% said they felt safer in
the monitored areas. See Aliya Frostick, CCTV Network Success in Fight against Crime, BATH
CHRON., June 4, 2004, at 4. According to a Norfolk, U.K., council administration officer, 96% of
the locals gave the city's public surveillance cameras their support. See Pendlebury, supra note 5.
16. The private sector contributed £20,000 toward the cost of the full system, which is
estimated at £280,000. See Jimmy Bums, Security Cameras Catch the Eye: The Early Success of
a Surveillance System in Northampton Town Centre, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 1993, at 6.
17. Joan Mcalpine, Caughton Video Nasty, THE SCOTSMAN, Nov. 2, 1994, at 15.
18. Bums, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. Taylor, supra note 13, at 45.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLCY

[Vol. 9

1993 to 1994, the first year the cameras were put to use. 2' New York City
also began its own program in 1993. Within 5 years, the crime rate was
down by 30% to 50% in public housing projects monitored by cameras. 2
The number of cameras in New York City is estimated to have risen in the
past 5 years from 2397 to 7200, a 300% increase.23 Baltimore began its
"Video Patrol" program in 1996 as an attempt to revive the downtown
business district and local economy, by restoring public confidence.24 The
effort began with 16 cameras, which quadrupled in number following the
success of the pilot project.25 Baltimore's public cameras record both audio
and video, allowing the police to watch and listen to what occurs in every
street and sidewalk of the city's 16-block downtown area around the
clock.26 In Redwood City, California, few people have complained about
similar intrusions because they are more concerned about gunfire than
police sensors, as one resident put it." The crime rate in the surveillance
areas dropped 11% in the first year and 33% in the second year.28
Seeing the positive results, many cities across the country have
launched similar programs or have applied for state or federal grants to
install their own systems. Reeling under one of the nation's highest
homicide rates, in addition to being a prime target for terror, Washington
D.C. has been upgrading its system to what may become the country's
most extensive computerized surveillance network. 29 The D.C. system will
link hundreds of government video cameras that already monitor streets,
subway stations, schools and federal facilities, making it the first city in the
United States to be able to view long stretches of the city and to create a
digital record of images.3 ° Many people seem to welcome the added
protection and enjoy the enhanced safety. In fact, residents of the crime-

21. City Ready for Close-up on Crime; Surveillance Camera to Monitor Downtown,
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 2003, at BI.
22. Tom Mooney, Providence Street Cameras Raise Questions ofPrivacy, PROVIDENCE J.BULL., Jan. 29, 1999, at IA.
23. Sabrina Tavemise, Watching Big Brother; On this Tour, Hidden Cameras Are Hidden
No More, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at BI.

24. Nieto, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. Timothy Egan, Police Surveillance of Streets Turns to Video Camerasand Listening

Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at A12.
27. Id.
28. Mark Helm, Study Urges Regulation of Surveillance, PATRIOT LEDGER, June 15, 1998,
at 06.
29. Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Forms Network of Surveillance: Police System of Hundreds of
Video Links Raises Issues of Rights, Privacy, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2002, at C01.

30. Id.
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ridden neighborhoods of the capital have petitioned government to install
more surveillance cameras. 3'
Surveillance cameras are now used in combination with other
technologies as a means of social control. The marriage between video
surveillance and computer technology has been consummated by a highly
sophisticated software program, FaceTrac, 32 that utilizes the so-called
automatic face-recognition technology to digitize and match up faces
against a database of digital portraits in seconds.33 It functions by
measuring 128 distinct facial features and contours numerically including the distance between the eyes, the slope and length of the nose,
the angle of the jaw, and the thickness of the lips - to produce a unique
template or precise mathematical profile of each scanned face. 34 The
numerical code of the acquired image is then matched against the codes of
individuals with outstanding arrest warrants stored in a law-enforcement
database.35 The program was originally developed by scientists at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the early 1990s as an
attempt to make computers recognize their designated users, but has since
been adapted by both government and the private sector for many other
uses. These include identifying wanted or missing persons, preventing
passport and driver license
fraud, protecting automatic teller machines, and
36
cheats.
casino
catching
An automatic face-identification system was used as a test project at
Super Bowl XXXV, held at Raymond James Stadium in Tampa, Florida,
in January 2001. Unbeknownst to the more than 100,000 fans and workers
at the event, their facial images and identities were checked electronically
against computer files of criminals as they passed through the turnstiles.37
31. David A. Fahrenthold, Crime-Plagued D.C. Neighborhoods Ask for Cameras,WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2003, at B01.
32. Graphco Technologies, the company that constructed the Super Bowl surveillance system,
is one ofseveral manufacturers offacial biometric devices. See Randy Dotinga, Biometrics Benched
for Super Bowl, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 31, 2002, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/
0,1284,56878,00.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
33. Declan McCullagh, Call It Super Bowl Face Scan I, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 2, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,41571,00.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
34. Lev Grossman, Welcome to the Snooper Bowl: Big Brother Came to Super Sunday,
Setting offa New Debate about PrivacyandSecurity in the DigitalAge, TIME, Feb. 12,2001, at 72.
35. Jay Bookman, Technology; In Your Face; The Ways Surveillance Equipment Can Scan,
Tape, Track and Profile You, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 25, 2001, at ID.
36. Grossman, supra note 34; Vickie Chachere, Super Bowl Surveillance Spurs Debate,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 2001, at 8A; Catherine Watson, New U.S. Passports Will Use
Facial-RecognitionTechnology, STAR TRIB., Sept. 28, 2003, at 8G.
37. Julia Scheeres, When Your Mole Betrays You, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 14, 2001, at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,42353,00.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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A relatively small database of 1700 faces assembled from FBI and police
files was used in the undisclosed test,3" in which 19 people with criminal
histories were identified, but no arrests were made because none of them
had committed crimes of a "significant nature," according to a Tampa
police spokesman.3 9 Both the software provider and the police officers
were satisfied with the software test.40 A system similar to the one tested
during the Super Bowl was installed in June 2001 in the historic
entertainment district of Ybor City in downtown Tampa. 4' A much larger
database of 30,000 mug shots of known felons and runaways was linked
to the 36 cameras installed around Ybor. 42 Tampa was the first U.S. city to
employ a face-scanning system, 43 but other cities have implemented similar
systems since then. 44
This new technology, which may become the security tool of the future,
is becoming increasingly popular with the war on terror shifting the
boundaries of law enforcement. Security planners for the 2002 Winter
Olympics have reportedly used 1000 video cameras - some equipped with
digital face-recognition technology - to keep track of athletes and
spectators, because the potential for terrorist attacks at international events
and large gatherings tends to be greater. 45 Makers of face-recognition
software have reported increased interest in and demand for their
technology from airports, law enforcement agencies, and motor vehicle
departments following the September 11 terrorist attacks.46
The effectiveness of video surveillance technology is the very reason
why the threats it poses to personal privacy are uncomfortably high;

38. Bob Kappstatter, Snooper Bowl; Tampa Cops Recorded Every Fan's Face, DAILYNEWS,
Feb. 2, 2001, at 1.
39. Peter Slevin, Police Video CamerasTapedFootballFans:Super BowlSurveillance Stirs
Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at AO1.
40. Lisa Greene, Face Scans Match Few Suspects, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001,
at IA (stating that Tampa police were pleased and might consider buying the technology someday);
see also Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowds for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2001, at Al (stating that the number of matches exceeded the expectations of police).
41. Geoff Dutton et al., Eye on Ybor, TAMPA TRIB., June 30, 2001, at 1.
42. Tom Kirchofer, High-TechSnoopingSpotlightsSafetyvs. PrivacyRift,BOSTON HERALD,
July 29, 2001, at 001.
43. B.C. Manion, Masked Protesters March Against Scanners, TAMPA TRIB., July 15, 200 1,
at2.
44. John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality ofFacial Recognition
Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 80,81 (2002) (stating that face-scanning technology
has been introduced in seven major cities besides Tampa).
45. Jay Weiner, Skiing, Skating, Snow and Security, STAR TRIB., Feb. 3, 2002, at IA.
46. William Welsh, Facing Trouble, 16 Wash. Tech., Feb. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/16_21/state/17781-i.htmi (last visited Oct. 15,2004).
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powerful devices that help the police could also hurt the public. To
mention but a few of the civil liberty concerns, the surveillance tapes could
be used, for instance, to target or harass certain ethnic groups, collect
information about people's political affiliations and activities, or blackmail
the taped subjects for various reasons. However conspiratorial these
theories may sound, they should not be completely ruled out given the
serious violations of the past.
In 2000, for instance, after numerous complaints, New Jersey State
Police and New York Police Department came under federal and internal
state investigations for systematically targeting minorities and subjecting
Black and Hispanic motorists to unwarranted traffic stops and
mistreatment.47 The final report confirmed the allegations of police
misconduct and widespread racial prejudice, revealing among other things,
that at least 8 of every 10 automobiles stopped and searched on the New
Jersey Turnpike over the 1990s decade were driven by Blacks and
Latinos.4" The state released documents showing that its anti-drug policy
actually encouraged troopers to use race as a factor at the cost of violating
the civil rights of Black and Hispanic drivers.4 9 Racial profiling is also
believed to be a common practice in other states." Unless properly
implemented and safeguarded, new surveillance technology may further
encourage racial profiling and be selectively used by police to engage in
racist abuse.5 '
In 1973, President Nixon secretly plotted to smear and punish his
political opponents. He ordered hush money to be paid to the Watergate
burglars, turned the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) against his perceived
"enemies," and used his influence to prevent the FBI from investigating
him.5 2 Against such and other equally shocking infractions by men of

47. Michael Posner, House Panel Orders Racial ProfilingStudy, NAT'L J., Mar. 4, 2000,
at 705.
48. David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Profiling Was the Routine, New Jersey
Finds,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
49. Wendy Ruderman, Profiling Was Used in War on Drugs; PapersShow TroopersLabeled
Ethnic Groups, RECORD, Nov. 28, 2000, at AO1.
50. Kit R. Roane, Are Police Going Too Far?,U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Feb. 7, 2000,
at 25.
51. A 1997 study conducted at the University of Hull in England found that black people
were watched by camera operators between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half times more often
than expected based on the percentage they represent of the overall population. See Jane Black, One
in the Eye for Big Brother, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2002, at http://www.businessweek.
com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2002/nf20020815_7186.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
52. Adam Clymer, Time (25 Years) and ScandalFatigueBlur the FallofNixon, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1999, atAl.
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power, it is not unreasonable to worry about an unscrupulous politician
using surveillance to harass critics and adversaries, or to track their
movements and blackmail them if caught on tape in compromising or
politically damaging situations.
Privacy faces unprecedented threats from pairing video technology and
information technology, which posed very distinct privacy issues in the
past." In the brave new world ofhi-tech surveillance and electronic recordkeeping, personal information gathered by activity-based surveillance
could be merged with tax, financial, medical, or other private records
stored in the databases of different bureaus to develop a detailed portrait
of an individual's private life. 4 The surveillance tapes could be used in
conjunction with other rich databases to put together extensive profiles of
people that include their political ideas, activities, plans, and personal
associations. Government videotaping of the public with high-definition
color cameras (that zoom, tilt, and pan 360 degrees) may appear as a valid
and harmless exercise of the state's police powers, justified by its
legitimate interest in making America safer, but it is also one that is ripe
for abuse.
The experimental usage of face-recognition technology at the Super
Bowl XXXV event has provoked a backlash among privacy-rights
advocates, who saw it as an overly intrusive presence in a free society."
The covert video policing conjured up images of George Orwell's
"Oceania," the despotic state described in 1984, whose citizens are
controlled via telescreens by the omnipresent Big Brother who never
blinks. 6 Florida ACLU director, Howard Simon, condemned the high-tech
surveillance at the Super Bowl as a "computerized police lineup" in which
the fans were unknowingly standing, and demanded that Tampa city
officials hold public hearings to answer questions about the use of
biometric surveillance equipment to recognize faces. 7 Professor Christine
L. Borgman, privacy expert and presidential chair in information studies

53. Thomas B. Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of
Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 995 (1999).
54. Id. at 995-97, 1010.
55. See Scheeres, supra note 37.
56. Following the Super Bowl test of the new surveillance equipment, California State
Senator Debra Bowen asked, "What kind of an Orwellian world would this be if every time you
walked into the mall your face was scanned, digitized and shipped out to police departments all
over the country to be placed side by side with the images of known terrorists and other criminals?"
See Michael Gardner, Face Recognitionand Privacyat Odds: Everyday People Put in High-Tech
Lineups, SAN DIEGO UNON-TRIB., Mar. II, 2001, at A-3.

57. Angela Moore, ACLU Protests Super Bowl Cameras, ST. PET
2001, at 3B.

SBURG TVES, Feb. 2,
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at the University of California in Los Angeles, worries that there may be
"a considerable margin of error in determining the identity of people who
get snagged" by this technology, which would exert a great toll on civil
rights.5" In fact, the Tampa Police Department, which began using the
system in June 2001, acknowledges that the whole system was halted for
several months due to a glitch in the operating system that ran the software,
but was turned on again in January 2002 after making improvements.59
Perhaps another computer glitch that goes undetected could result in the
erroneous matching of the faces of innocent civilians with the digital
images of criminals. But absent a computer failure or a software problem,
the system will always fail to differentiate between identical twins. As Dr.
Joseph Atick, the developer of the Face-It software lightly put it, "If their
mother can't tell them apart, the technology can't either."6 ° Some studies
have also found that the system can give false positives and false negatives
because faces tend to change over time.6 A broader civil liberty concern
is that, as the underlying information and communications technologies
becomes less expensive and more powerful, the photographs of all
Americans, notjust suspects and convicts, could wind up in a large central
file that enables law enforcement authorities to keep tabs on the activities

58. Robert Trigaux, Cameras ScannedFansfor Criminals,ST. PETERSBURGTIMES, Jan. 31,
2001, at IA.
59. Welsh, supra note 46.
60. Dr. Joseph Atick, Co-Founder and President of Visionics Corp., joined a CNN.com chat
room on October 1, 2001 for an open online interview with the public. See Joseph Atick, How the
FacialRecognitionSecurity System Works, CNN.CoM, Oct. 1,2001, athttp://www.cnn.com/2001/
COMMUNITY/10/01/atick (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) (an expectedly staunch advocate of
surveillance technology, Dr. Atick asserts, "[t]he only privacy being invaded is the privacy of
criminals, because they are the ones in the database."). See Daniel F. Drummond, FaceCamera Use
Draws Scrutiny; Crime Fightingvs. Privacy at Issue, WASH. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at Cl. The
flawed premise of Dr. Atick's argument is that it is only criminals who want privacy, but there are
many noncriminal reasons to want privacy, particularly in a society that values social liberty. See
Jan Glidewell, A PictureIs Worth a Thousand Questions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001,
at 1.
61. Biometric Technology: It Knows Who You Are: Hand, Face, Signature Recognition
Systems are as Simple to Use as They are to Install, I I CABLING INSTALLATION & MAINTENANCE
36 (2003). A study conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology found that
photos of the same person taken 18 months apart resulted in missed matches 43% of the time. See
Kara Platoni, A CleanScan on FacialRecognition: Is the OaklandAirport'sNew Security Software
the High-Tech Equivalent of Unlawful Search and Seizure?, E. BAY EXPRESS, Nov. 7, 2001,
available at http://www.eastbayexpress.com/issues/2001-11-07/cityside2.html (last visited Nov.
15, 2004).
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of whomever they want.62 Apart from any potential abuse, the very idea of
imposing involuntary videotaping and photographing on a democratic
society is amenable to critique and challenge, not only on legal and social,
but also on political grounds. It is the American people, not the
government, who should be deciding on the tradeoff between their right to
anonymity and their personal safety. It is well within the people's
democratic right to approve or disapprove any of these protective measures
if the goal is their safety.
III. FOURTH

AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF VIDEO
CAMERA SURVEILLANCE

Katz v. United States6 3 annulled the physical trespass doctrine and
defined the meaning of the unreasonableness clause anew to include
intangible invasions. According to Katz, Fourth Amendment protection
only applies when a person possesses a subjective expectation of privacy
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.' Therefore, in order to
assess the constitutionality of electronic visual surveillance of public
places, we need to answer two questions, as an initial matter. The first is
whether a person may have an expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable in a public place, because "a subjective
expectation of privacy does not, by itself, give rise to Fourth Amendment
protection." 5 The second question, which is a corollary of the first, is
whether recording events occurring in public space constitutes a search. If
a person may have no reasonable expectation of privacy at all in a public
setting, then public video surveillance falls outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. However, if such an expectation may exist in certain
situations, then some types of surveillance are controlled by the
Amendment and subject to the warrant requirements.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a "public place," such as a
thoroughfare or a recreational park, is an area to which "access [is] not
meaningfully restricted,"66 and is "visible to the public,"" as well as

62. Editorial, Super BowlSnooping,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,200 1,at 16; David Kopel & Michael
Krause, Face the Facts:FacialRecognition Technology's TroubledPast- and TroublingFuture,
REASON, Oct. 2002, 29.
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
concurring).
64. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
65. United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 999
(1993).
66. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974).
67. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
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"accessible to the public."6 8 Conversely, a private place, such as a home or
an office, is "a location usually not accessible to the public"69 because
"obvious efforts have been made to exclude the public." 7° The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that people do not have reasonable expectations
of privacy against government intrusion in physical characteristics, 71 (legal
or illegal) activities, 72 and objects 73 that are exposed to the public because
"the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence
of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the
public. '74 It follows that the visual observation of a public place is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment because "only an intrusion, into an
area in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with
the specific intent of discovering evidence of a crime constitutes a
search. '75 Although the analogy between the human eye and the electronic
eye is self-evident, it needs to be legally established by ajudicial opinion.
One of the earliest cases to import the general rule that people have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in public places into the area of video (as
distinct from aerial) surveillance is United States v. Taketa.76 The video
camera in this case was hidden in the ceiling of an airport office, a private
place in which the defendant possessed "a reasonable privacy expectation
that he would not be videotaped by government agents....", Reversing
Taketa's conviction, the Ninth Circuit Court drew a distinction between the
68. United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 398-99 (1981).
69. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n.5 (1984).
70. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 319 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that "[njo person can have a
reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can
reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world"); see also United States v. Mara, 410
U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (stating that "[h]andwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to the public, and
there is no more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a person's script than there
is in the tone of his voice").
72. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) (asserting that "the Fourth
Amendment permits a duly authorized law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest in a
public place even though he had adequate opportunity to procure a warrant after developing
probable cause for arrest").
73. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1979) (stating that "objects such as weapons
or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant"); see also
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).
74. Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,41 (1988); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S.
765, 771 (1983) (stating that "[t]he plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once
police are lawfully in a position to observe an item firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in that
item is lost").
75. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 n.1 (1973).
76. United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 677-78.
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"exceptional intrusiveness of video surveillance" of the defendant in a
personal office, which is "a continuous search of anyone who entered the
camera's field of vision," and the "[v]ideotaping of suspects in public
places," which does not violate the Fourth Amendment.7" A suspect cannot
constitutionally challenge the videotaping of his person in a public place
simply because "the police may record what they normally may view with
the naked eye."'7 9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed its findings in Taketa two years later in
UnitedStates v. Sherman. 0 In Sherman, the defendants sought to suppress
a silent videotape produced by surreptitious government surveillance of a
drug transaction that occurred on a mountain pass near Helena, Montana."'
While conceding that surveillance is "subject to the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment," the circuit court held that the Amendment was not violated
because none of the defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy
since the "transaction took place in plain view in a public place along a
highway," and hence, "everything that was captured by the camera could
seen by a person hiding in the trees where the
just as easily have been
82
located.,
was
camera
It should be noted that the camera used in Sherman was covert.8 3 The
addition of what we may call the "hidden observer" factor, however, does
not create a Fourth Amendment issue because what controls is the nature
of the place under observation and the reasonableness of the privacy
expectations of the persons therein rather than the location of the camera
or the observer. The gathering of visual information in Sherman entailed

78. Id. at 675, 677. Circuit Judge Robert R. Beezer coined the creative term "video search"
to describe video surveillance in violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy. See also United
States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the court is "satisfied that
these requirements comport with the demands of the Constitution, and guard against unreasonable
video searches and seizures").
79. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 677.
80. United States v. Sherman, No. 92-30067, 990 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id. at *5. "Public place" and "plain view" represent parallel legal concepts in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in that anything on display or in a public place can be observed without
a search warrant. The plain view doctrine thus justifies warrantless video surveillance of public
places because "a plain view observation involves no intrusion into an area in which the defendant
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. As long as no such intrusion occurs, the observation does
not rise to the level of a search, and Fourth Amendment limitations are not triggered."
Commonwealth v. Sergienko, 399 Mass. 291, 294 (1987). The "open fields" doctrine applied in
Oliver v. United States, can provide an equally compelling justification for public videotaping
because it also allows law enforcement officers to see and seize at will any evidence in open view
without a warrant. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
83. Sherman, 990 F.2d at *2.
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no impermissible intrusion into an area in which the defendants had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, because the illegal transaction caught
on tape took place in open space and in broad daylight.8 4 There is no
constitutionally significant difference between evidence obtained by a
secret camera scanning a public place and a private citizen or a police
officer hiding behind a bush or standing behind the tinted window of a
room overlooking the same place.
In light of the holdings of Taketa and Sherman, we may conclude that
if what the camera records is open to public view and can be readily seen
by normal unaided vision, then the place under surveillance is public, and
the video monitoring of the people and activities occurring in that place
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 5 On the other hand, if the camera
records activities occurring in a location that is not visible to the public,
then it is a private place, and therefore, an argument can be made that the
warrantless video monitoring thereof is an illegal search under the Fourth
Amendment because a search, by definition, "consists of looking for or
seeking out that which is otherwise concealed from view."8 6
The conclusions that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
public places and that the electronic visual surveillance of such places does
not offend the Fourth Amendment do not end the inquiry. The
determination that still lies ahead, which may not be so easily made as the
preceding ones, is when would government surveillance violate the Fourth
Amendment or at least raise constitutional concerns. To address this
question, we need to explore the nature and potential impact of modem
surveillance technology on the Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Jennifer Granholm was among the first legal commentators to contend
that video surveillance of public places may, under certain circumstances,
violate the Fourth Amendment. In a 1987 article, she undertook to "expand
the meager constitutional artillery currently available to opponents of
public surveillance. '87 Granholm begins by arguing that while a person is
only entitled to virtually total privacy at home, he does not shed that
privacy in its entirety at his doorstep when he leaves home, but is allowed
to take with him at least a vestige thereof as he walks down the street in

84. Id
85. Id.
86. People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 316 (Colo. 1984).
87. Jennifer Mulhern Granholm, Video Surveillance on Public Streets: The Constitutionality
ofInvisible Citizen Searches, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 689 (1987). While this article was written a few
years before Taketa and Sherman confirmed the constitutionality of public surveillance, it still
presents several well-taken arguments against the practice which are worthy of our consideration.
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broad daylight."8 A pedestrian cannot have a reasonable expectation that
the public or the police will not gaze upon him, but he may reasonably
expect not to be focused upon by cameras equipped with powerful zooms
or sound-recorders that could zero in on a letter he may be reading, or tape
the words he may be speaking.89 This intriguing argument raises the two
separate constitutional questions ofwhether video cameras with (1) soundmonitoring capability, and (2) telescopic capacity, would be so intrusive
as to implicate the Fourth Amendment.
A. Can the Camera Have Audio?
The sound enhancement of such technology also presents constitutional
issues. To clarify the limits of video surveillance, let us consider a
hypothetical situation where a camera equipped with a sensitive
microphone picks up a private conversation between two people sitting on
a park bench or standing in a train station concourse. Katz controls the
determination of whether constitutional protection applies in either
situation. 90 If the expectation that a private conversation carried on in a
public place will not be recorded by a government-installed and
government-operated camera is both subjectively and objectively
reasonable, then the Fourth Amendment protects that expectation and
prohibits government from engaging in that practice.
Assuming that the first prong of the Katz test has been met by
manifesting a subjective intent to maintain privacy, we need only consider
the second.9 It is well-established that society is not prepared to recognize
that our two fictional personages have reasonable expectation of privacy
in their physical attributes and facial expressions, but can it be said that
society would not honor their expectation of privacy in their personal
conversation? Hardly so, for to assume that the expectation that their words
would not be recorded by a sensitive microphone is reasonable in the eyes
of society is to "merely recognize the everyday expectations of privacy that
we all share."92 Freely engaging in private conversations in public places

88. Id. at 695, 696.
89. Id. at 694, 695.
90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
91. Id.at 361.
92. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,98 (1990). Although the issue presented in Olson was
whether an overnight guest had a reasonable expectation of privacy, its holding is relevant to the
situation under consideration because the question of reasonableness was decided in light of the
"everyday expectations ofprivacy that we all share" and the "longstanding social custom that serves
functions recognized as valuable by society." Id.
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without fear of surreptitious government surveillance is a right assumed to
be inherent in living in a free society.
Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that the camera can be
substituted for the eyes of a police officer, but can it be also be argued that
the sensitive microphone be substituted for his ears? Even if we assume
that a police officer could have been physically present at the scene and in
proximity to the conversers, we cannot further assume that they would
have held the same conversation in his presence. Besides, if a person
occupying a telephone booth momentarily has a constitutional right to
exclude "the uninvited ear," 93 why should a person having a face-to-face
private conversation not be entitled to rely on Fourth Amendment
protection? It is the reasonableness of the assumption that no one could
hear, much less record, a conversation inaudible to the public that gives
rise to a constitutionally protected privacy interest.
This argument equally applies to hidden microphones. In his concurring
opinion in United States v. Bronstein,94 Circuit Judge Mansfield
distinguished between the use of a "sensitive and schooled canine" that
enhances police officers' olfactory senses, and the use of a hidden
microphone that enhances their auditory senses. Relying on Katz, he
elaborated that "[the officers'] own senses were replaced by the more
sensitive nose of the dog in the same manner that a police officer's ears are
replaced by a hidden microphone in areas where he could not otherwise
hear because of the inaudibility of the sounds. The illegality of the latter
practice in the absence of a search warrant or special circumstances has
long been established."95 Therefore, we cannot but conclude that the use
of sensitive or hidden microphones with visual surveillance would violate
the right to privacy under Katz as well as the principles and values
enshrined in the Fourth Amendment, whose wording unequivocally affirms
personal security against such intrusions because "[flew threats to liberty
exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping
devices."96
The above discussion focused on sensitive or hidden microphones, but
what about normal ones that are visible to the public? It would be
inappropriate to apply the above prohibitions if the recording device was
no more sensitive than the human ear and was placed in a conspicuous
location, because the "officer substitute" argument would be valid under
these circumstances. Visible microphones with normal sound recording
93.
94.
95.
96.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. (Mansfield, J.,
concurring).
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
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installed in public places could be regarded as the electronic equivalent of
police officers patrolling their beat. United States v. McLeod (1974) 9"
confirms this view. On four separate occasions, a government agent stood
four feet from McLeod as she used a public telephone. Without the aid of
any listening devices, the agent overheard the defendant give out wagering
and gambling information over the telephone in violation of federal law.9
At trial, the circuit court overruled the defendant's motion to suppress as
evidence the telephone conversations, noting that "the agent was located
in a public place and overheard the conversation by McLeod without the
use of any amplification device... ,,9 Applying the Katz test, the circuit
court held that "conversations carried on in a tone of voice quite audible
to a person standing outside.., are conversations knowingly exposed to
the public."'' 0 Audible speech made in public, therefore, falls outside the
ambit of Fourth Amendment protection due to the absence of a reasonable
privacy expectation therein.' '
It should be added that, given the same circumstances, sound recording
could not be successfully challenged under the Fifth Amendment either.
The bar on self-incrimination is not violated when a person standing next
to a microphone makes an incriminating statement that is subsequently
used against him in court. Conspicuous government-installed cameras
equipped with microphones, like roving patrols and roadblocks, may be
considered "visible signs of the officers' authority."'0 2 Therefore, making
a self-incriminating statement near one such microphone is the
constitutional equivalent of making a voluntary admission of guilt in the
presence of police officers. The U.S. Supreme Court clearly stated in Lopez
v. United States °3 that the "risk of being overheard by an
97. United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 1188.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1032 (1969)).
101. In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan wrote,
[A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders
are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances
would be unreasonable.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
102. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
103. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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eavesdropper... is probably inherent in the conditions of human society.
It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak."' 4 No
person may voluntarily assume the risk that the audible statements he
makes might be heard by the police, and then seek refuge in the Fifth
Amendment if his statements are actually heard and introduced into
evidence. United States v. Stinson"° ' well illustrates that point. A police
officer overheard the defendant talking on a payphone in the lobby of a
federal building and making audible statements that were the basis for his
warrantless arrest. 106 Upholding the arrest and the charges, the district court
held that "[v]oluntary statements of any kind, not made in response to
police interrogation are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their
admissibility is unaffected by Miranda and its progeny."' °7 The selfincrimination defense failed because, "[b]y speaking in a loud voice in a
public place, Defendant exposed his communications to anyone in ear
shot."' o
We may now draw up our first guideline for surveillance: no highly
sensitive or hidden microphones should be used with video surveillance
because they have the potential ofharming and violating legitimate privacy
interests. Only visible microphones with normal sensitivity should be used.
Because electronic surveillance is widely used but largely unregulated,
some state legislatures have undertaken to enact laws that ban the
recording of private conversations in public places to protect their
constituents until the U.S. Supreme Court sets a uniform standard
enforceable in all jurisdictions across the country. In Delaware, for
instance, a state statute defines a misdemeanor invasion of privacy, among
other things, as the installation of any device outside a private place for
hearing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting ordinarily inaudible sounds
without consent. 09
That the Fourth Amendment may not bar government from using
cameras with regular auditory capabilities does not make it a desirable
practice as a matter of public policy. But the dearth of constitutional
options leaves citizens with the legal alternative of petitioning their elected
representatives. Federal and state ordinances can be used in this area as a
104. Id.at 465.
105. Crim. No. 4-93-64, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20354 (D. Minn. 1993).
106. Id.at *3.
107. Id. at *9(citing United States v. Wood, 545 F.2d 1124, 1127(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1098 (1977)).
108. Id. One district court explained the legal meaning of "loud" as follows: "To be 'loud' the
words must be sufficiently audible to be heard by others and the speaker must have intentionally
pitched them to this purpose." Karp v. Collins, 310 F. Supp. 627, 637 (D.N.J. 1970).
109. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (2004).

JOURNAL OF TECHNOOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. 9

supplement to the U.S. Constitution to protect privacy. In the meantime,
we can at least expect the posting of a warning sign that reads: "IT
SHOULD BE ASSUMED THAT THIS SURVEILLANCE CAMERA
RECORDS AUDIO AND VIDEO." 0
B. Can the CameraBe Visually Enhanced?
We now consider the constitutionality of using video surveillance
cameras with vision enhancement capabilities. Here, the "officer
substitute" argument is greatly weakened, if not completely shattered, by
the fact that some of the surveillance cameras available today have zoom
lenses capable of reading a cigarette package at a distance of 100 meters."'l
A camera that enables a government agent to see so far beyond his natural
ability cannot be deemed a substitute for or an extension to his eyes. So
what would be the constitutional status of an electronic device that
empowers an officer to read a personal note or letter that a civilian may be
holding in public from a considerable distance? We need not rely solely on
guesswork to answer this question when a federal court has addressed a
similar issue.
In UnitedStates v. Kim," 2 the FBI used an 800 millimeter telescope to
observe activities in Kim's apartment and balcony from a building a
quarter of a mile away from his building." 3 The telescopic lens was so
powerful that federal agents could read the title of the newspaper Kim was
holding inside his apartment."' From a building on the opposite side of
Kim's building, other agents used high-powered binoculars to keep an eye
on the terrace that connected the elevator of Kim's building with the
entrance to his apartment."' The information acquired through the
continuous surveillance of the apartment was used to convince a judge to
issue an order for a wiretap." 6 The wiretap yielded incriminating evidence
that was used to charge Kim, among others, with illegal gambling

110. A sign with almost the exact wording is actually displayed in classrooms in a Texas public
school to advise the students that whatever they do or say will be recorded by the surveillance
cameras inside tamper-proof enclosures. See S.C. Gwynne, Is Any Place Safe?, CNN.coM, Aug.
17, 1999, at http://www.cnn.com/allpolitics/time/1999/08/17/safe.schools.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
111. Taylor, supra note 13 (100 meters equals 110 yards, which is roughly the length of one
city block).
112. 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976).
113. Id.at 1254.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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offenses." 7 The defendants challenged the government's usage of the
artificial viewing aids as a search, and an unreasonable one since no
warrant had been obtained in advance."' The government contended that
no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred because all the areas under
surveillance were in plain view and the officers conducting the surveillance
had the right to be where they were." 9 But contrary to the government's
contention, the Kim court asserted "[t]here can be no question.., that the
protection recognized by Katz includes protection against unreasonable
visual intrusions."' 12 "Visual intrusions," stated the Kim court, "can
interfere with an individual's right to be left alone just as powerfully as the
eavesdropping at issue in Katz."''
Although Kim involves the visual search of a nonpublic area, 122 its
rationale can be extended to the use of vision-enhancing technology in
public places based on the rejection of government's formulation of the
"plain view" doctrine and elucidation of what it actually means. The
government's position was simply that no search had taken place, because
all the activities observed in the apartment were in plain view. 23 Drawing
a distinction between naked-eye observation and technologically enhanced
observation, the court explained that "[a] 'plain' view of Kim's apartment
was impossible; only an aided view could penetrate."' 24 The agents'
observations could not be justified under the plain view exception because
"the 'plain' in plain view must be interpreted as permitting only an unaided
26
plain view."' 25 In reaching its conclusion, the Kim court distinguished
the precedents of United States v. Loundmannz,'27 in which police
observed defendant's illegal bookmaking activities on the street from a

117. See Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1254.
118. Id.

119. Id. The government invoked the plain view doctrine to defeat the defendant's claim to
Fourth Amendment protection. Implicit in the government's argument, ofcourse, is the assumption
that the use of a telescopic instrument to monitor a private area does not constitute a visually aided
search.
120. Id.
121. Id.

122. "It is inconceivable that the government can intrude so far into an individual's home that
it can detect the material he is reading and still not be considered to have engaged in a search." Kim,
415 F. Supp. at 1256 (emphasis added).
123. Id.at 1254.
124. Id.at 1256.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1254-55.
127. 472 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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high building, 128 and United States v. Grimes,129 where a special
investigator observed defendants loading boxes of contraband in their
vehicle from a nearby field. 3 ' Despite the use of artificial amplification
devices in the two cases, the illegal activities the police saw "would have
been visible to any curious passerby."'' By contrast, what the agents saw
in Kim could not have been seen by anyone without the aid of intrusive
sense-enhancing technology.
Kim presents a most compelling case against the employment of
sophisticated visual aids in public surveillance. If "[b]y opening his
curtains, an individual does not thereby open his person, house, papers and
effects to telescopic scrutiny by the government,"' 32 then, by the same
token, by reading a letter in public a person does not voluntarily expose
himself to the high-tech surveillance devices available to today's police
forces. Additionally, proper Fourth Amendment analysis under Katz, as
confirmed in Kim, is not predicated on whether a reasonable person would
expect the police to view an area or to observe an activity, but rather on
whether one can reasonably expect the general public to do so.' There is
much in common between the Katz test applied in constitutional law and
the reasonable-man standard applied in tort law'34 in that both look to how
a prudent and rational person would exercise due care under a given set of
circumstances. It cannot be argued with any validity that a person acts
recklessly - and hence abandons his privacy interests - by reading a
personal note in a public place. To the contrary, the natural assumption that
a government agent would not attempt to read the note from a great
distance with an electronic device is one of the "basic foundations of
privacy, security and135decency which distinguish free societies from
controlled societies."'

128. See id.at 1378.
129. 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970).
130. See id. at 708.
131. Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1255 (quoting James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.l
(D.C. Cir. 1969)).
132. Id. at 1257. The government urged that the defendant did not exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy by not drawing his curtains, but the Kim court found such an interpretation
to be "totally at war with Fourth Amendment values." Id. at 1256.
133. See Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the
Concept ofFourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 940, 957 (1997).
134. In tort law, a "reasonable man" is a hypothetical person who possesses and exercises
"those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its
members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 B cmt. b (1965).
135. Kim,415 F.Supp.at 1257.
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Electronic visual surveillance has become more sophisticated with the
introduction of new night-vision equipment that utilizes infrared lights and
viewers. This is another type of visual enhancement that needs to be
considered. Infrared technology is used in making night-vision gear that
36
allows the user to see through darkness and to observe nighttime activity.'
Some infrared cameras have the capacity to capture an image in the dark
and to convert it into a detailed, high-resolution visual image.'3 7 The
constitutional question, again, is whether equipping a surveillance camera
with infrared viewing capability would violate the Fourth Amendment
because it would render observable what could be otherwise unobservable.
The relevant case of Salazar v. Golden State Warriors3 ' supports a
negative answer to this question.
In Salazar, a private investigator used a night-vision infrared highpowered scoping, among other high-tech surveillance equipments, to
videotape the plaintiff snorting cocaine in a car in a parking lot.'3 9 The
plaintiff sued the defendant for invading his privacy by videotaping him
while in his vehicle, arguing that the parking lot should be considered "a
private place because it was not 'highly traveled but rather dark and
isolated."" 4 To determine whether an impermissible privacy invasion took
place, the district court considered two elements: "(1) intrusion into a
private place, conversation, or matter, and (2) in a manner highly offensive
to a reasonable person."' ' The plaintiff failed the first part of the test
because he did not cite any authority to distinguish "a public from a private
place based on the amount of traffic or light,"'42 nor did the district court
find traffic and light to be factors that were "determinative in
characterizing a place as public or private."' ' As for the second element,
the district court found that the "intrusion was de minimis' ' 44 and "not
highly offensive to a reasonable person"'45 because the "investigator
merely videotaped the plaintiff from a distance in his car and in places

136. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-AssistedPhysicalSurveillance: The American
Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 407 (1997).
137. Kent Greenfield, Camerasin Teddy Bears: Electronic VisualSurveillance andthe Fourth
Amendment, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991).
138. No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2366 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id. at *6.
141. Id. at *4.
142. Id. at *6.
143. Salazar,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2366, at *6.
144. Id. at *11.
145. Id.
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where plaintiff was in public view."14' 6 The intrusiveness of videotaping
was further abated by "the absence of audio capabilities."' 47 Analyzing
each of the determining factors, the court concluded that the "plaintiff's
privacy rights were not violated."' 48
This brings us to our second restriction on sense-aided public
surveillance. Based on Salazar,the isolation or darkness of a public place
does not make it private, or give rise to reasonable privacy expectations
that warrant Fourth Amendment protection." 9 Therefore, as long as
infrared rays are not used to penetrate an opaque wall or ceiling to look
inside a house, they could be used by government to keep dim streets safe
at night. 50 Infrared sight could be most valuable where crime deterrence
and detection is most needed, that is, in less traveled and poorly lit areas
where criminal activity typically takes place.
On the other hand, high-powered telescopic lenses should not be used.
A CCTV camera with a powerful image magnifier would not be
constitutionally permitted because it would reveal details that would not
normally be seen by the human eye from ten or fifteen feet away, such as
a close-up view of what a person may be reading or writing. A remote
camera could be equipped with a zoom without offending the Fourth
Amendment if it magnifies to the scale of the naked-eye, so that the video
image resembles what would be normally seen by a person passing by or
standing several feet away. Government may, and indeed should, use some
electronic optical devices to protect the public from crime, but if this end
is achieved at the price of raising security concerns of a different nature,
then the threat to personal security has merely been replaced rather than
removed. The common argument that police should be allowed to use any
privacy-invading technology available to the public to level the playing
field is not a meritorious one, because "the fact that Peeping Toms abound
does not license the government to follow suit."' This argument also fails

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at *9.
Salazar,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2366, at *13.
See id. at *6.

150. In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically outlawed the warrantless use of wallpenetrating surveillance technology that enables government to observe and collect information on
activities taking place inside a house. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("We think
that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,' constitutes a search....").
151. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw. 1976).
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because, as a legal scholar simply put it, "the Constitution
often bars
' 52
government from doing what private citizens may do."'
C. Can Picturesbe Compared to Files of Wanted Felons?
The last aspect of public surveillance to consider under the Fourth
Amendment is the recent utilization of face-recognition technology
discussed briefly earlier. As already mentioned, face-recognition systems
are an amalgam of surveillance and computer technologies, which make
comparisons between the identities of persons caught on tape against a
database of stored images. The system translates the characteristics of the
human face snapped by a surveillance camera into a set of numbers, called
an eigenface, which is automatically matched up in real time against the
unique algorithms assigned to the facial structures of each criminal mug
shot on a digital watch-list.' Face-recognition systems are designed to
generate a percentage score of how close an identification is. 54 The system
is also adjustable; it can be calibrated tightly to flag very close matches or
loosely to flag slightly close matches. 55 When a person is identified by the
system, a police officer
is immediately dispatched to the scene to confirm
56
the identification.
Although makers of face-recognition systems tout their precision and
reliability, they have proved otherwise when put to the test. 57 Pilot testing
152. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, "I Always Feel Like Somebody's Watching
Me ": A Fourth Amendment Analysis of the FBI's New Surveillance Policy, WRIT, Jun. 14, 2002,
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020614.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
153. Thomas C. Greene, Feds Use Biometrics Against Super Bowl Fans, REGISTER, Feb. 7,
2001, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/02/07/feds-use-biometrics against-super
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
154. Christopher S. Milligan, Note, FacialRecognition Technology, Video Surveillance,and
Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 295, 304 (1999).
155. Hiawatha Bray, "Face Testing " at Logan is Found Lacking, BOSTON GLOBE, July 17,
2002, at B 1.
156. The National Park Service began using a face-recognition system to protect the Statue of
liberty and its many visitors in May 2002. See Corey Kilgannon, Camerasto Seek Faces of Terror
in Visitors to the Statue of Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2002, at BI. In the event of a positive
match, the procedure is as follows: a U.S. Park Police officer is notified and the visitor is detained.
Id. The detainee is questioned further if the officer decides that the detainee's face matches the
database image. Id.
157. A study found that, under optimal conditions, the best identification rate was 85% on a
database of 800 persons, 83% on a database of 1,600, and 73% on a database of 37,437. See Fred
Reed, Biometrics Improving, But Still FallsShort, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at C 10. An earlier
study by the Department of Defense found that the system made a correct match two out of three
times if the test subject allowed the camera to get a good picture. See Marc Caputo, Face-Off
What's Best Way to Spot Airport Terrorists?FaceScanningHas PotentialButCouldBe Flawed,
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of one such system for ninety days at Boston Airport in 2002 returned less
than positive results and cast serious doubts on its reliability. 58 The system
either failed to signal when it should, or gave a great surplus of signals. 5 9
When set tightly, the system allowed many people who should have been
identified to get by, and when set loosely, it produced false positives and
identified a large number of pictures from the database as possible matches
for one person. 6 In a more recent test at Logan Airport, the system failed
38% of the time to match the identities of employees who volunteered for
the pilot program.' 6 ' It was also found that the system could be thrown off
by simple disguises such as glasses and facial hair, and that
lighting,
62
background, and camera angles can interfere with matching.
With a failure rate exceeding one third of all matches, face-recognition
technology is still in its infancy. Yet the government has already begun
utilizing it to restrict access to authorized personnel in airports and to
identify criminal and terror suspects, 63 which raises a number of Fourth
Amendment issues that have not been tested in court. The first legal
question stems from the fact that face-recognition systems are not nearly
as reliable as human agents for recognizing suspects. A suspect identified
by the system cannot be "mirandized" and handcuffed promptly as if he
had been identified by an undercover officer, but must be stopped and
questioned first to ensure that the computer match is correct. The
investigative stop of a flagged suspect to verify his true identity is an act
of seizure controlled by the Fourth Amendment." To make sure that these

PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 18,2002, at IA. If uncooperative, the subject was recognized only one out
of three times. Id.
158. Bray, supra note 155.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Shelley Murphy& Hiawatha Bray, FaceRecognition Failsat Logan; Eye Scan Rejected,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2003, at Al.
162. See James F. Sweeney, The All-Seeing Eye; GrowingNumber ofSurveillance Cameras
Sparks Big BrotherPrivacy Debate, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 6, 2002, at LI.
163. See Martha McKay, Drivefor Security Boosts Biometrics:High-Tech Identification Wave
Builds, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Feb. 4,2003, at 005; Dean E. Murphy, As Security Cameras
Sprout, Someone's Always Watching, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, at AI.
164. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("It must be recognized that whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
The fact that the encounter with the police may not culminate in an arrest is irrelevant because "the
Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station
house and prosecution for crime ... "Id.; see also State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1995)
("We have generally held that a reasonable person would not believe that he or she has been seized
when an officer merely approaches that person in a public place and begins to ask questions.").
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agents,"1 65

"intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government
but "authorized by law"' 6 and "limited in objective and scope,"' 6 the
courts will have to decide what degree of authentication is sufficient to
support the reasonable suspicion required to seize a person for brief
questioning. 68 The same determination69will have to be made with respect
to probable cause if an arrest is made.
The still unsettled constitutional question is whether the use of a facerecognition device per se constitutes a search. Is the taking of one's facial
biometric measurements without one's consent a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment? At least one commentator has argued
that facial scans should rise to the level of a search." 0 The determination
of whether government action constitutes a search rests upon three
considerations: the scope of the intrusion, the nature of the personal
information revealed, and the reasonableness of one's expectation of
privacy. 7 ' We have already indicated that, under the Katz test, a person
may not harbor a reasonable privacy expectation with regard to what he
knowingly exposes to the public, such as his facial features, which are

165. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Determining what constitutes reasonable suspicion when using an adjustable computer
identification system is a necessary precondition to ensure the seizure that follows a positive
identification is legitimate. A random investigatory stop lacking reasonable suspicion is an illegal
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883
(1975) ("[A] requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means
of guarding the public interest ... we conclude that it is not 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment to make such stops on a random basis."). All evidence flowing from an illegal seizure
"must be suppressed as tainted fruit." See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1991).
169. An arrest, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, can be made without the use of
handcuffs; a Terry stop escalates into an arrest if the detention lasts longer than is reasonably
necessary for police to investigate the suspicions against the seized individual. See, e.g., United
States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616,619-20 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153, 15758 (IstCir. 1987); United States v. Danielson, 728 F.2d 1143,1146-47 (8th Cir. 1984). If probable
cause is lacking at the precise point when "police action which detains a suspect ceases to be a
nonarrest seizure and becomes an arrest," the arrest is illegal, and the products thereof are
inadmissible. United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1974).
170. See John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial
Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 82 (2002) (arguing that facial
scanning ought to be treated as a search for two reasons: first, "the scans enable access to so much
more information than would be available to the public view," and second, "facial scans operate
much like a consensual encounter between civilians and law enforcement officials" in a stop-andidentify situation, where civilians do not have the ability to "refuse the encounter.").
171. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616.
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hardly "a mystery to the world."' 17 The counterargument, however, is that
visible does not necessarily mean recognizable, especially in a crowded
place like a sports arena, where tens of thousands of people are closely
gathered. Moreover, while most people expect to be observed by others in
public, they do not expect to be subjected to a "computerized police
lineup" in the words of Florida's ACLU director,'73 where a sophisticated
electronic device silently gathers their physiological data for biometric
identification.' 74 This argument is redolent of Justice Powell's dissent in
Californiav. Ciraolo,'75 in which he objected to the majority's theory that
commercial flights and focused police overflights posed equal risks to
privacy, contending that the most that passengers aboard the former may
obtain is a "fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the
landscape and buildings over which they pass."' 176 Therefore, the key
determination that would have to be made in a facial-identification case is
whether a person in public may reasonably expect to be free from the
surveillance of a high-tech camera capable of picking him out of a crowd
by scanning and analyzing his face digitally. The basic assumption upon
which the above argument rests is that a person attending a football game
or strolling in a park may only be randomly observed, but not specifically
sought out. Obviously, this is not always the case. To the contrary, law
enforcement agents tend to be on the alert when a felon is on the loose,
especially when he is thought to be dangerous. Sometimes they even post
the pictures of wanted felons on the Internet and in government buildings
frequented by the public, such as the U.S. Post Office or the Department
of Motor Vehicles, in an attempt to alert and engage private citizens in the
ongoing manhunts. The expectation that people will not suspiciously stare
at one's face is thus unrealistic and does not by itself warrant Fourth
Amendment protection.
The sophistication of a face-recognizing video camera does not create
a constitutional issue either. From a Fourth Amendment perspective, the
high-tech camera is no different from a police detective standing around
a street comer or a stadium entrance with a couple of mug shots in his
hand. Since the computer system does not retain any record of snapshots
that have no match,' it could be argued that face-recognition technology
infringes upon one's right to privacy no more than a detective secretly

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
Moore, supra note 57.
Milligan, supra note 154, at 319-20.
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Drummond, supra note 60.
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observing passersby, and accordingly, must escape Fourth Amendment
oversight. Moreover, facial identification systems are less intrusive than
video surveillance systems, which are used in over sixty urban centers in
the United States, 17 because the former keep the images for a few seconds,
the duration of the database search, whereas the latter capture and retain
the images of the suspect and innocent alike for several days.179 Being less
offensive to individual privacy, face-matching cameras are less susceptible
to constitutional attack than conventional surveillance cameras.
Despite the lower degree of intrusion imposed by face-recognition
systems, the American people seem to have reacted less favorably to them
than to other visual surveillance techniques used in the past. 8 ° This is
arguably because government has not undertaken to educate the public
about this new technology or to answer even the most basic questions that
trouble many people before introducing it. As this promising technology
improves, there is little doubt it will come to popular use to broaden the
surveillance capabilities of government and enhance overall law
enforcement efficiency. The following are some of the questions that one
commentator suggested the government ought to fully answer to dispel
public fears before using the system on a broad scale:
1. Are the captured images retained by the police or discarded?
2. What databases are the captured images checked against - known
felons, fugitives, sex offenders, police suspects, terror suspects ... etc.?

3. What reports, if any, has the government reviewed to evaluate the
effectiveness of this surveillance system?
4. What action is contemplated if the surveillance system produces a
"hit"? That is, would the suspects be placed under surveillance and
followed, or would they be stopped and questioned, or would they be
arrested on the spot - and if arrested, on what basis?' 8 '
If people received satisfactory answers to these questions, they might
be more receptive to the use of the system, which, if properly used, would
make the streets safer without impinging on personal privacy as much as
continuous video surveillance.
178. Milligan, supra note 154, at 301.
179. See infra note 238.
180. In mid-July 2001, a small crowd staged a protest against the newly installed facerecognition security systems in Tampa, Florida; the demonstrators wore Lone Ranger masks and
made obscene gestures at the police cameras. See Marion Manuel, In-Your-Face Surveillance
Sparks Protest in Tampa, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 13, 2001, at 6A; AP News, Surveillance

Cameras Incite Protest,N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2001, at Al i.
181. Dority, supra note 4. The original questions focus specifically on the Super Bowl XXXV
incident of January 2001, but I have rephrased them more broadly to capture the main concerns
about face-recognition surveillance in general.
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D. Can CamerasReach into People's Curtilage or Other
PrivatePlaces?
Having discussed various aspects of public surveillance, we now turn
to government surveillance of nonpublic areas. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of aerial surveillance of the curtilage in
California v. Ciraolo,'82 and confirmed its holding later in Florida v.
Riley."8 3 Since then, the police have been using aerial surveillance as a
legal investigative tool in circumvention of the warrant process, based on
two premises. First that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
against naked-eye observations made from public navigable airspace.' 84
Second that surveillance of a visible area conducted from a lawful vantage
point does not amount to a search, even if that area is traditionally
protected by Fourth Amendment.'85 This raises a question of utmost
significance as to whether government may use a video surveillance
camera to monitor a private but observable area, such as a residential
curtilage, pursuant to the same premises.
The case that unequivocally answered this question in the negative is
United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez."6 The government suspected that
Cuevas-Sanchez was a drug trafficker who used his home as a drop house
for illegal drugs.' 87 An order authorizing the video surveillance of the
exterior of Cuevas' home was applied for and obtained. 8 The warrant
application included a detailed description ofthe house, the reasons behind
the government's suspicions, and a statement that "conventional law
enforcement techniques" had failed. 9 The video camera, which was
placed on a power pole overlooking Cuevas' fenced backyard, enabled the
police to observe the removal of drugs from the false gas tanks of vehicles
in the defendant's yard.'90 On another occasion, camera monitors saw the
defendant loading his car with garbage bags that were believed to contain

182. 476 U.S. 207 (1986); see id. at 213-14.
183. 488 U.S. 445 (1989); see id. at 449.
184. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed." Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 2 13-14.
185. Id. at 213 ("That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.
The Fourth Amendment protection ofthe home has never been extended to require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.").
186. 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987).
187. Id. at 249.
188. Id. at 249-50.
189. Id. at 249.
190. Id. at 250.
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drugs.' 9 ' The police stopped defendant shortly after driving off and
searched his car without a warrant to find 22 pounds of marijuana in the
garbage bags.'92 When the defendant's home was subsequently searched
under a warrant, 58 additional pounds of drugs were discovered.'93
Cuevas appealed his drug convictions, contending, among other things,
that the application for surveillance of his property conformed to neither
statutory nor constitutional standards, and that the fruits of the video
surveillance should be excluded. 9 4 The government's most forceful
response, of which the Fifth Circuit found little to approve, was that the
defendant in this case, as in Ciraolo, had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the activities conducted in the driveways and portions of the
backyard that were observable from the street, and therefore, a warrant was
not required to put the camera on top of the pole.'95 The circuit court
rejected this seemingly valid argument on two grounds. First, the
government requested an authorization to use "a potentially indiscriminate
and most intrusive method of surveillance" upon oath that conventional
law enforcement techniques had been tried but had failed. 196 Yet in
asserting later that the property was visible to a casual observer, the
government essentially maintained that conventional surveillance methods
would have sufficed. 197 The "juxtaposition of such contentions trifles with
the Court"'9 and exposes "the sophistry underlying the government's
argument."'99
Second, the circuit court also dismissed the government's argument as
an attempt to "stretch Ciraolo'sholding far beyond its natural reach."200
The defendants in Cuevas and Ciraolosatisfied the first prong of the Katz
test by manifesting a subjective expectation of privacy and encircling their
backyards with fences. As for the second prong that turns upon the
expectations of society, Ciraoloteaches "a fly-over by a plane at 1,000 feet
does not intrude upon the daily existence of most people."' ' By contrast,
a video camera installed on a utility pole to monitor all of a person's
backyard activities "provokes an immediate negative visceral reaction:

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 250.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 250.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 301, slip op. at 3498 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Id.
Id.
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251.
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indiscriminate video surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian
state."2 ' Therefore, contrary to the government's assertions, "[i]t does not
follow that Ciraolo authorizes any type of surveillance whatsoever just
because one type of minimally-intrusive aerial observation is possible."2 3
That the video surveillance was carried out from a public and a lawful
vantage point does not make the government action less intrusive because
"the area monitored by the camera fell within the curtilage of [Cuevas']
home, an area protected by traditional fourth amendment analysis."204 The
ultimate measure of constitutionality is not the location of the observer, but
the reasonable expectation of the observed in the location under
surveillance - the reason the circuit court plainly stated that the
defendant's "expectation to be free from this type of video surveillance in
his backyard is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.""2 5
The foregoing analysis helps us establish another important guideline
for electronic visual surveillance. While government needs not adhere to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements to install cameras that
monitor a public place, it must fully comply with them if the cameras are
to be pointed at a nonpublic place. For that practice to comport with
constitutional standards, no camera should ever be aimed at any private
dwelling, or at any residential curtilage or backyard, unless specifically
authorized by a judge. While the aerial exposure of the home or curtilage
may allow warrantless surveillance from a plane, it does not further justify
warrantless video surveillance because it poses a far more serious threat to
the privacy interests in the home.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF VIDEO
CAMERA SURVEILLANCE

Another challenge to video surveillance could come under the First
Amendment chilling effect doctrine.20 6 Many of the legal commentators
who explore the constitutional issues raised by surveillance seem to focus
their analysis, for the most part, on the search and seizure implications of
the Fourth Amendment. But surveillance also has profound First
Amendment implications, as it may jeopardize the fundamental right to
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. There is a chilling effect when "potential speakers, out of reasonable caution or even an
excess of caution, may censor their own expression well beyond what the law may constitutionally
demand." Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 683 (2003).
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free speech and expression. In this regard, the question that needs to be
addressed is when would government surveillance be so intrusive as to
justify judicial intervention to protect First Amendment freedoms of
speech and expression. The answer to this question can be found in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Laird v. Tatum, °7 which ripened
into a holding in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago. °8
In 1967, the Army was called upon to assist the local authorities in
controlling civil disorders, whereupon it established a covert intelligence
system for surveillance and investigation of civilian political activity to
obtain information on actual or potential disturbances. °9 Naming the
Secretary of Defense as the defendant, a number of civilians instituted a
class action against the Army, claiming that the mere existence of the
military surveillance system imposed a chilling effect on their exercise of
First Amendment rights.210
A closely divided Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue,
because they failed to state "a claim of specific present objective harm or
a threat of specific future harm."21 ' Moreover, any claimed chill is merely
subjective and therefore not justiciable "absent actual present or
immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental
action."2' 1 2 But while the Court majority found that no objective chill was
caused by the Army surveillance activities, the dissent found serious
infringements on First Amendment rights.2" 3 Dissenting from the fiveJustice majority, Justice Douglas denounced the conclusion that plaintiffs
had failed to establish the requisite standing as "too transparent for serious
argument. ' 214 In his mind, the Army's use of "undercover agents" and
"cameras and electronic ears for surveillance" and the storage of the
information collected on civilians "in one or more data banks" were
sufficient grounds to sue.215 He agreed with the court of appeals that the
Army surveillance "exercises a present inhibiting effect on their full
expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights, 21 6 because
lawful civilians naturally fear that "permanent reports of their activities"

207.
208.
209.
210.

408 U.S. 1 (1972).
627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ili. 1985).
See Laird,408 U.S. at 3-7.
Id. at 3.

211. Id. at 14.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
1971)).

Id. at 15.
See id. at 16-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Laird,408 U.S. at 24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947,954 (D.C. Cir.
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will be maintained in the government's databanks, that their "'profiles'
will appear in the so-called 'Blacklist,"' and that their personal information
could possibly "be released to numerous federal and state agencies upon
' In sum, the "'deterrent effect' on First Amendment rights
request."217
posed by government oversight marks an unconstitutional intrusion."218
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago21 9 presented a similar
question as to whether "the first amendment permits local police
authorities to infiltrate, observe, record, and disseminate information
gathered on the lawful speech activities of private individuals and private
organizations when the police have no reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct."22 The plaintiffs in this case, as in Laird, were all peaceably
organized citizens who have exercised their First Amendment rights in the
past to "end war, racism, and repression" without engaging in any violent
or unlawful activity."' Filming, videotaping, photographing, and recording
of the plaintiffs' activities were among the techniques used by Chicago
Police Department (CPD) to collect information, which was filed in police
dossiers containing extensive public and private information on each of the
plaintiffs.222 The police also set up equipment to monitor and photograph
all those who attended the plaintiffs' open summer convention, but no
surveillance, wiretapping, or photography was carried out by the police in
their home or an otherwise private enclave that they used.223
Noting that this case was "unlike the typical case of police
' and that the actions of CPD were distinguishable from the
surveillance"224
' the Alliance
"passive observational activities upheld in Tatum,"225
court
found that the facts supported a justiciable claim of chilling effect.226
Further, it found that the surveillance operation and tactics not only created
an objective chill, but also violated the First Amendment. 227 The Alliance
court's determination was based on four counts of First Amendment
violations committed by the City of Chicago, of which we consider the two
most relevant to our inquiry.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
1972)).
226.
227.

dissenting).
Id. (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (Douglas, J.,
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The first violation was CPD's invitation of a Chicago Tribune news
reporter to an Alliance convention, who subsequently published falsehoods
on the organization. Assuming that the statements the police made to the
reporter about Alliance were not false, the "police action" of inviting him
in itself unnecessarily infringed on first amendment rights because "there
is no reason why the police had to invite the reporter to the campsite at
all. 228 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the police accumulated a
massive file on at least one plaintiff that was "troubling to the court"
because it covered almost every facet of her life.229 In addition to a detailed
chronology of her political activities, the file contained extensive
biographical and financial information, such as her home address, birth
date, weight, eye color, schooling, marriages, children, social and personal
pursuits, bank statements, and personal checks.2 30 The depth and breadth
of the information shows that the government had been "tenaciously
tracking and piecing together the details of [her] life from multifarious
sources." 231 It could be fairly assumed that "much of the extensively
personal information in the file could only be obtained from nonpublic
sources," but the resulting probe is "so intrusive as to amount to an
invasion of privacy even if the individual pieces of the probe are from
public sources., 23 2 The police maintenance of a file "so extensive as to
create an entire portrait of her personal, family, financial, and political life,
violated her first amendment' rights in the absence of a reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct. 233
As the Laird dissent and the Alliance decision make abundantly clear,
video surveillance could violate the First Amendment if accompanied by
other means of invasion, such as infiltration by informants or amassing
extensive records and dossiers about personal lives, absent any reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing. No First Amendment problem was found with
the presence of cameras or the recording of events in areas open to public
view by itself. Rather, it was the simultaneous file buildup that resulted in
the constitutional violation, because mere observation by the police or
television cameramen would not give rise to suspicions of keeping files in
data banks or checking names off a long list of blacklisted civilians on
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government computers for future reference.234 Furthermore, it is doubtful
that a chill caused by audio-video surveillance alone could trigger First
Amendment protection, for a person is likely to be chilled by a sensor
recording his speech no more than by a police officer vested with the
authority to effect a warrantless arrest in a public place hearing the same
speech.235 One cannot challenge audio-video surveillance under the First
Amendment any more than one can challenge foot and vehicle patrols that
have the right, indeed the obligation, to roam the streets and neighborhoods
to preserve the peace and enforce the law.2 36 As long as the sound sensors
attached to cameras are not more sensitive than normal human hearing and
the tapes are recorded over or kept only as evidence of criminality, it would
be hard to condemn sound recording on First Amendment grounds. The
mere possibility that the government could keep the tapes for more than the
statutorily defined period or use them illegitimately may not by itself
justify judicial intervention because "federal judicial power is to be
exercised to strike down legislation, whether state or federal, only at the
instance of one who is himself immediately harmed,
or immediately
2 37
threatened with harm, by the challenged action.
Three final legal guidelines could be derived from the above cases to
keep surveillance from impinging upon any First Amendment rights. First,
the government may not share any of the video footage or images of
private citizens with news agencies or media organizations, nor post them
on Internet web sites. Second, absent articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, the authorities should not be allowed to merge public surveillance
tapes with other pieces of data available from public or private sources to
pry into a person's life. Finally, to make surveillance less intrusive and
minimize the potential for abuse, videotapes should not be replayed or
retained by the police in excess of a statutorily defined period unless for
investigative purposes.2 31 If no crime is reported or no violation is
234. Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video
Surveillance,31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1094 n.120, 1129 n.412 (1997).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 71 & 101.
236. The assumption here is that the police videotaping and photographing are allowed only
as a precaution in the event that a protest deteriorates into vandalism or violence, but not for
"intimidating people who disagree with the government" or denying them their "right to engage in
anonymous political activity without being monitored by law enforcement." See David Hench,
PoliceFilmingofRally-Goers DrawsConcern: Maine Anti- War Demonstratorsand Others Want
StrictState Rules on How ImagesAre Used and Disposed Of,PORTLAND PRESs HERALD, Oct. 20,

2002, at IA. There is no reason for police to store the tapes or the pictures unless arrests have been
made and documentation is needed to "show the truth." Id.
237. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 504 (1961).
238. In Baltimore, for instance, surveillance tapes are discarded or reused after ninety-six
hours unless they are needed for evidence, and police review the tapes only if there has been a
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suspected to have occurred within that time frame, the tapes ought to be
erased or recorded over.
There is no doubt that the social and psychological burdens of public
surveillance would be reduced to an absolute minimum if only those
cameras that have been installed pursuant to a court order were manned.
Though privacy-conscious, this policy would have the double disadvantage
of diminishing the deterring effect of surveillance, and, more importantly,
preventing the police from stopping criminal activity while still in
progress. Prohibiting the police from monitoring surveillance cameras is
to allow them to act only after the fact. If common sense dictates that
"[o]ne need not wait to sue until he loses his job or until his reputation is
defamed, 239 it also stands to reason that police should be able to prevent
a crime, if at all possible, before its successful completion.
V. SUMMING UP

Over the past decade or so, public video surveillance has been used in
a number of advanced countries, preeminently the United Kingdom, to
enhance police efficiency and operational effectiveness. Police departments
in the United States and elsewhere are crediting video surveillance with
detecting and solving crimes, cleaning up unsafe neighborhoods, deterring
antisocial behavior, reducing overall crime levels in monitored areas, and
managing traffic congestion and incidents, which contributed greatly to
urban renewal and community revitalization programs. This makes hightech camera policing at least as, if not more, effective than traditional foot
and vehicle policing in crime control and order maintenance.
But while surveillance has proven useful in many ways, it has also
given rise to privacy and civil liberty concerns. There is fear that the same
footage or image that could be used to aid the police in their work could
also be used to harm the innocent out of racial or political hatred. Another
serious concern is that the system could be used in conjunction with
databases to build up photo and data files on citizens who are not criminals
or wanted by the police. Public surveillance technology, therefore, must be
regulated by a set of strictly enforced rules to ensure government

report of a crime in the area under surveillance. See Paul W. Valentine, BaltimorePatrollingSome
Streets by Camera, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1996, at B03; Editorial,Eye on East Ohio: Surveillance
of Even Public Areas Should Have Safeguards, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Oct. 11, 1997,

at A-12.
239. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 26 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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compliance with the law so that citizens reap the public safety benefits of
surveillance while avoiding its potential negative side effects.
Following in Britain's footsteps, the United States is increasingly
turning to surveillance technology in the fight against crime and terror.
Despite the rapid expansion of public video surveillance, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not undertaken to determine its constitutional status. But based
on precedents in which the Court has consistently held that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in public, it can be inferred that
"traditional" camera surveillance will readily pass constitutional musterunless additional technology is employed to augment the natural senses of
sight and hearing. These artificial enhancements may violate some of the
privacy rights to which a person should be entitled even in public space.
For instance, when one engages in a private conversation in an inaudible
tone of voice, one is justified in expecting that one's speech will not be
electronically picked up by a sensitive microphone. When one reads a
personal note in public, one is equally justified in not expecting
government to try to read its contents by a powerful telescope. The
reasonableness of these expectations to society at large is what warrants
Fourth Amendment protection and justifies banning the use of hidden
sensors and audio or visual equipment with high magnifying capabilities.
Infrared viewing that penetrates no walls but merely helps the police see
dim public areas at night falls outside this exception because darkness does
not render an otherwise public place private. Although the use of visible
cameras that have an audio component may be objectionable to many, it is
not unconstitutional either - at least so long as the sensors do not amplify
sound - because audible speech exposed to the public is unprotected. By
the same token, sound recording cannot be challenged under the Fifth
Amendment because audible statements voluntarily made in public by a
person who is not being interrogated are not inadmissible on selfincrimination grounds.
More recently, the government has begun using cameras, along with
computer technology, to identify felons and terror suspects through facerecognition technology. The high margin of error of face-recognition
systems has raised public concerns because every time the machine makes
a mismatch, the wrong person might get seized or arrested by the
authorities. That aside, computerized face-recognition systems are arguably
constitutional because they only take a picture of one's face, which is
exposed to public view anyway. The act of analyzing a person's face
mathematically in real time does not by itself rise to the level of a Fourth
Amendment search because an undercover agent with pictures of offenders
can look around and make the same positive identification without a
warrant. If anything, facial identification cameras are less intrusive than
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other forms of surveillance because they record neither motion nor sound,
and keep scanned images forjust a few seconds. The constitutional issues
arise, however, when an officer accosts a person and questions or arrests
him based on the information gleaned from the system. It is imperative that
the federal judiciary set clear guidelines for using that new technology.
The constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance does not serve
as a basis for warrantless video surveillance of the curtilage or any other
private area. As a matter of law and common sense, a fixed camera
allowing the police to continuously monitor and possibly record every
activity occurring in a private place cannot be likened to the cursory look
that a passenger on an airplane gets of the ground below. It follows that for
video surveillance to be constitutional, authorities should not probe inside
a private place or direct a camera at an area that is not visible from the
ground level to a casual passerby.
A First Amendment challenge to video surveillance cannot be
successfully made unless other intrusive methods are simultaneously used
by government, such as the compilation and storage of private information
on law-abiding citizens without any reasonable suspicion of illegal
conduct, or the unauthorized sharing of that information with a third party
for non-investigative purposes. The mere existence of cameras is not
"chilling" in a constitutionally objectionable sense. For a chill to be
objective and justiciable, the plaintiff must show evidence of a personal
tangible harm or a threat of specific future harm. To avoid an
unconstitutional chill of the rights to free speech and expression, tapes
should not be retained longer than is provided in the law, and the video
information should not be merged with other databases and sources, unless
to act on an articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, as already done
in some municipalities.
Although public camera surveillance - at least as currently practiced
does not seem to violate any constitutional provision, there are those
who may still feel uneasy about this new form of policing because what is
constitutionally permissible may well be socially unacceptable. But when
constitutional remedies fall short, those who zealously guard their privacy
and social freedom can only petition their representatives. The inability of
the judiciary to act takes the issue out of federal courts into open public
policy forums and legislative hearings where citizens may decide through
elected officials what best suits them. In absence of constitutional
interdictions and judicial regulation, we can only set strict statutory rules
and institute legislative safeguards to make sure that surveillance has a
minimally intrusive impact on a free society.

